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Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: 
the Case of France 
Abstract 
We use the 1982 and 1993 reforms of the French pension system in the private sector 
to study the relationship between Social Security benefits and the well-being of the 
elderly between the late 70’s and the beginning of the new century. Affecting people in 
a different way, depending on year of birth, gender or socio-economic status, these 
reforms provide some sources of identification to estimate the effect of benefit 
changes on the standard of living of elderly families. To avoid spurious correlation or 
endogeneity problems in the determination of the impact of Social Security benefits on 
well-being we compute simulated social security payments and compare their 
evolution to various measures of well-being based on income, consumption, poverty, 
inequality or life satisfaction for both elderly and non-elderly families. We then focus 
on the 1982 and 1993 reforms. Our estimations conclude to a general increase in 
income, consumption and subjective well-being. However, a one euro increases in 
simulated benefit does not induce a one euro increase in after tax income (except at 
the top of the distribution), which shows some substitution between the different 
sources of income available for the elderly households. Estimation of difference in 
difference models to evaluate the impact on income and consumption of the 1982 and 
1993 reforms underlines that it may exist asymmetry in the substitution effect between 
the different sources of income of the elderly depending on the sign of the change in 
generosity of the pension reforms. 
Keywords: Retirement policies, Income, Poverty 
Systèmes de pension et bien-être des retraités :  
le cas de la France 
Résumé 
Nous utilisons les deux réformes majeures de 1982 et 1993 du régime de base et des 
régimes complémentaires des travailleurs du secteur privé pour identifier la relation 
entre le système de pension et le niveau de vie des retraités. Ces réformes ont affecté 
différemment les personnes selon leur date de naissance, leur sexe ou leur statut 
socio-économique. Ces différences permettent l’identification du lien entre niveau des 
allocations et niveau de vie des retraités. Afin d’éviter les problèmes d’endogeneité 
dans nos régressions, nous avons simulé les niveaux de pension par cohorte et 
comparé leurs évolutions avec différents indicateurs du niveau de vie des retraités : 
indicateurs de revenu, de consommation ou de bien-être subjectif sur l’ensemble de la 
période avant de faire une analyse plus spécifique des réformes de 1982 et 1993. Nos 
estimations concluent à une augmentation du niveau de revenu, de consommation ou 
de bien-être lorsque le niveau des pensions de retraite augmente. Toutefois, une 
augmentation d’un euro de la pension ne conduit généralement pas (sauf pour les 
plus hautes pensions) à une hausse de un euro du revenu après impôts. On observe 
donc des phénomènes de substitution entre les différentes sources de revenu des 
personnes âgées. Des estimations par double différence des réformes de 1982 et 
1993 mettent en évidence des asymétries dans les effets de substitution entre les 
sources de revenus possibles selon les variations dans la générosité des systèmes de 
pension. 
Mots-clés : Système de retraite, revenu, consommation, pauvreté 
Classification JEL : J26, I32, D31   3
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Introduction 
With the imminent retirement of baby boom cohorts and the increase in the relative 
number of retirees in the population, the French Pension advisory committee 
estimated in 2006 that the cost of the Social Security program was to rise by about 3 
points in 2050 to reach 16 percent of GDP.  To face the demographic transition, 
reforms in the existing Social Security programs have been implemented since the 
mid 90’s. The major changes were for workers in the private sector in 1982 and 1993, 
and in a lesser extent in 2003.  The trend in their pension system’s generosity 
changed in the mid 90’s. After becoming more generous until 1982, the French private 
sector pension scheme became less generous from 1993.  An important reform of the 
civil servant pension scheme has also been voted in august 2003, decreasing the 
generosity of the system too.  
As the decline of labor force participation of older workers is often seen as resulting 
from incentives inherent in the pension systems and their legislation, substantial 
attention has been devoted to the impact of these reforms on the activity of old age 
workers. The studies have concluded to a massive decrease in the labor market 
participation of workers older than 60 after 1982 (e.g. Blanchet and Pelé, 1999). The 
impact of the 1993 reform is more ambiguous. Even if the reform has had an impact 
on labor market participation (Bozio, 2007), the activity rate of senior workers didn’t 
increase again as much as could be expected.   
Another key aspect of these reforms, which has been less studied, is how they have 
affected the well-being of retirees. The direct effect of an increase in the generosity of 
the pension system must be an increase in the income of retirees. But this result holds 
only when no substitution effect appear, i.e. if individuals do not adapt their behavior to 
changes in the pension system.  Indeed, they can either adapt their labor supply, 
increase or decrease their saving or face some changes in the level of transfers they 
get from other family members. If changes in either of these components or in the 
three of them are important, an increase in the system generosity can even lead to a 
reduction of the income of the elderly.  Conversely, a decrease in the system’s 
generosity could lead to an increase in old workers income.  These phenomena would 
be very extreme but the question of the substitution effects is a key point in view of 
changing demographics. Indeed, forecast increases in pension expenditures have led, 
in France, as in many other developed countries, to reforms that include cuts in 
benefits available to retirees. Depending on the variation of their other sources of 
income, the impact of a drop in the benefits on the standard living of the elderly can be 
more or less important and this question deserves a specific examination.   
In this paper, we use the successive reforms of the French pension system in the 
private sector to study the relationship between Social Security benefits and the well-
being of the elderly between the late 70’s and the beginning of the new century. 
Affecting people in a different way, depending on the year of birth, gender or socio-
economic status, these reforms provide some sources of identification to estimate the 
effect of benefits changes on the standard of living of the elderly families. To estimate 
these effects, we regress the pension benefits on several indicators. However, care 
must be taken on potential reverse effects when studying the causal effect of Social 
Security programs on the standard of living. For example, if individuals become poorer 
and Social Security is redistributive, then observed benefits will increase. Empirical 
regressions will make it appear as if Social Security programs were deteriorating living 
conditions even if there is no causal relationship. To avoid this reverse effect we 
compute simulated social security payments and compare their evolution to various 
measures of well-being based on income, consumption, poverty, inequality or life 
satisfaction for both elderly and non-elderly families. We focus on the 1982 and 1993 
reforms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is devoted to a detailed presentation of 
the French Social Security system and its main reforms since the 50’s. The French   6
household budget survey, the well-being indicators and their evolutions since the late 
70’s are presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and 
the construction of simulated benefits. Results are presented in sections 4 and 5 and 
the last section concludes.    7
I - Background on the French Social Security System since 1950 
I.1 General Structure 
The French system is complex, but its structure can nevertheless be summed up quite 
simply in the following way. For a large part of the population (wage earners in the 
private sector), pension benefit rely on two pillars: 
  The basic general scheme (Social Security). It provides benefits 
corresponding to the share of gross wages below the Social Security ceiling
1. 
The general scheme gathers more than 70% of contributors and of retirees.  
  Complementary schemes, organized on an occupational basis. They consist 
in a large number of specific schemes that are federated in two main 
organisms ensuring inter-schemes demographic compensation: AGIRC for 
executive workers and only for the fraction of their wages over the Social 
Security ceiling and ARRCO for other workers and executives’ wages below 
the ceiling. In 1972, contributing to a complementary scheme became 
compulsory. Today, complementary schemes provide about 40% of the 
retirement pensions for wage earners in the private sector. 
The complexity of the French system is essentially due to the existence of a large 
number of exceptions to this general rule of organization. When Social Security was 
created, in 1945, civil servants or people employed in State-owned companies, who 
already benefited from more generous dispositions, refused to join the new system. 
They kept their own pension schemes. Adding the private and public sector, the 
coverage rate is about 90%. The following analysis will thus deal with these two 
populations.  
Before entering the details of the main rules of these pension schemes, let us make a 
few remarks on self-employed.  When Social Security was created, the self-employed 
decided to adopt cheaper systems offering lower protection. The idea was that a large 
part of their retirement needs were likely to be covered by other sources, such as 
income from their professional assets. Their pension schemes are on an occupational 
basis. The benefits are not calculated on a reference wage but on an indicator of the 
professional income.  Beyond this generality, each of these pension schemes has its 
specific rules. Their coverage rates being low, we will not make any particular 
presentation of their rules.  
Another element of complexity of the French system is that a lot of people do not 
spend their whole career in one scheme. As a consequence, they can belong to 
several pension schemes in which they can retire at different ages according different 
rules. The following analysis will not focus on this level of detail but will concentrate on 
wage earners with a career either in the private or in the state public sector.  
 
I.2 Wage earners in the private sector 
I.2.1 General regime 
The basic general scheme offers contributory benefits corresponding to the share of 
wages below the Social Security ceiling. The pension depends on the length of the 
workers’ career and on the earning profiles during this career. It is proportional to the 
number of quarters of contribution to the system (truncated to Nmax quarters), and to 
a reference wage. The reference wage is computed as the average of the annual 
                                                       
1 € 681 per month in 1979, € 2,279 in 2001 and € 2,773 in 2008.   8
wages on 10 to 25 years of the pensioners' career (detailed below). The past nominal 
wages are reevaluated at the time of benefit claiming according to a set of 
retrospective coefficients. 
The general formula of the basic pension for private sector wage earners has 
remained unchanged since 1945 but the computation of each of the components of 
the pension has known major changes. The main trend is that the initial pension has 
become more generous until 1982 and less generous from 1993. More precisely, in 
the period covered by this paper there have been three main reforms, one in 1971 (the 

















α  (1) 
with α depending on the period. 
Before 1971, the pension was granted from 60 with a proportionality coefficient α of 
20%. This coefficient increased by 4% per year when people delayed retirement. The 
number of contribution quarters Nmax was 120, in link with the short contribution 
periods as the system had only started in 1945. The reference wage was computed on 
the basis of the last 10 annual wages. Under 15 years of contribution, people received 
an annuity proportional to the contributions they had paid. If the benefits were too low 
or under 5 years of contribution, no benefits were granted. Social Security simply 
reimbursed the global amount of past contributions.  
In 1971, the Boulin Law made the system more generous but still with very strong 
incentives to wait until the age of 65. The proportionality coefficient α was set to 25% 
for people claiming their first benefit at 60 and increased by 5 percentage points for 
each year worked after this age. The number of contribution quarters Nmax was set to 
150. Even if retirement was allowed at 60, the incentive to delay retirement remained 
very strong. Whatever the number of contribution years, the proportionality coefficient 
α strongly increased with age of retirement. The reference wage was computed on the 
basis on the best 10 annual wages. 
The 1982 reform made retirement at 60 really practicable as it lowered the 
disincentives to retire before 65
2. A new formula was introduced for α, incorporating 
both the age and the total number of years of contribution to the pension scheme: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) quarters of N A − − × × − = 150 ; 0 max ; 65 4 min 25 . 1 % 50 α  (2) 
with A the retirement age and A<65. If A≥65 then α=50%. 
The maximal value of α remained equal to 50%, reduced by 1.25 percentage point per 
missing quarter either to reach the age of 65 or to reach the target number of 
contributed quarters. The adjustment applied was the one which led to the most 
favorable outcome for the pensioners. The target number of contributed quarters was 
set at 150 until 1993. In other words somebody retiring with 150 contributed quarters 
was entitled to the maximal proportionality coefficient (α=50%) whatever his/her 
retirement age.  
The 1993 reform started reducing the system’s generosity. It lowered the level of 
pensions by changing the computation method for the reference wage, with a 
progressive change to a formula based on the 25 best annual wages instead of on the 
                                                       
2 This was already the case for the women who had contributed 150 quarters to the pension scheme since 
1977.    9
10 best annual wages. The rule is the following. The calculation remained on the 10 
best annual wages for generations born before 1934, the number of years moving up 
by one year every year for generations born between 1935 and 1948, being set to 25 
for all generations born after 1948. Nmax remained set to 150 but the reform made it 
harder to obtain the maximal proportionality coefficient α=50%. Indeed, equation (2) 
became:  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) quarters of N N A T − − × × − = ; 0 max ; 65 4 min 25 . 1 % 50 α  (3) 
with A the retirement age and A<65. If A≥65 then α=50%.  
In this formula, NT, the target number of contributed quarters, increased from 150 (for 
cohorts born before 1934) to reach 160 for generation 1943. The number of quarters 
is up 1 each generation. The maximal value of α is reduced by 1.25 percentage point 
per missing quarter either to reach the age of 65 (as before) or to reach the target 
number of contributed quarters.  
Some additional observations must be added to this presentation. Equation (1) implies 
that pensions, at the time they are claimed, were or are computed in current French 
Francs or Euros. They are revalued each year on a discretionary basis. During the 
1970s and early 1980s, the general policy was to over index these pensions (with 
respect to the average gross wage), in order to make up for the initial gap between the 
standards of living of workers and of pensioners. Since the mid 1980s, the practice 
has rather consisted in an indexation on prices. This practice has been confirmed by 
the 1993 reform.  
When the pension benefit falls below a floor, it is raised to the level of that floor (about 
€ 12,000 in 2000) for individuals who can claim a full rate pension. These provisions 
mainly concern women who had part-time jobs or whose careers were short, and 
whose annual earnings are thus very low. They create a strong additional incentive to 
postpone retirement until the full rate. The full rate is granted either for those retiring 
with the target number of contributed quarters, or for those older than 65 or for those 
retiring for disability. 
Finally, basic survivor benefits are paid to the surviving spouse of a deceased worker 
if the survivor fulfils three main conditions: being older than a threshold age, having 
been married at least two years or having a child, and an income condition. The 
threshold age was set at 65 years in 1945 and then decreased to be fixed at 55 in 
1972. Until 1975 the income condition was very strict. Survivor benefits could not be 
drawn simultaneously with pension benefit. Since 1975, the basic survivor pension 
can be added to the personal basic pension for people receiving a total personal 
income lower than a fixed amount. The basic survivor benefit amounted to 50% of the 
basic pension of the deceased spouse before 1984, 52% between 1985 and 1993 and 
is equal to 54% since. Survivor benefits have had an upper bound and a lower bound 




These schemes are almost fully contributory and are organized on a DC basis 
(although they are not funded). Workers accumulate points during their careers which 
are the pension’s basic unit of calculation: 
  These points are accumulated during the workers’ career in proportion to 
contributions. The contribution rate is fixed, and 1 € contributed in year t is 
                                                       
3 Most of the information on the ARRCO and AGIRC pension schemes is issued from Bajram-El Moudden 
(2000).    10
considered as equivalent to the formal buying of 1/PP(t) points, where PP(t) is 
the purchase price of one “point” (the official term for this purchase price is 
salaire de référence).  
  The pension is then equal to the total number of points accumulated over the 
pensioner’s career, multiplied by a coefficient V(t) (valeur du point), which is 
fixed each year. 
For a pensioner who started working at time t0 and stopped at time t1, the pension 





0 ' ) ' (
) ' ( ) ' ( ). ( pension
t
t t t PP
t w t t V τ
 (4) 
where τ(t’) and w(t’) are respectively the contribution rate and the worker’s wage at 
time t’. Only a fraction of the wage is taken into account for computing contributions 
and points accumulated each year: 
  For executives, contributions are collected by ARRCO for the part of the wage 
below the ceiling, and by AGIRC for the segment of the wage which is 
included between 1 and 8 ceilings. 
  For non-executives, the wage is truncated to three times the social-security 
ceiling, and contributions are collected by ARRCO. 
The ARRCO and AGIRC pension schemes were created after the general regime 
(1961 for ARRCO and 1947 for AGIRC) through the unification of numerous 
preexisting schemes. Concerning the retirement age in these complementary 
schemes, normal retirement theoretically remains at age 65. For retirement below 65, 
a quasi actuarial adjustment is applied. Since the 1982 pension reform, this 
adjustment is not applied to people who fulfil the conditions for a full rate basic 
pension (more than 37.5 years of contribution). 
The general formula has remained unchanged since the creations of ARRCO and 
AGIRC but the computation of each of the components of the benefit has gone 
through a number of changes that we shall briefly describe.  
 
Evolution of the ARRCO pension scheme 
The ARRCO pension scheme was created through the unification of numerous pre-
existing schemes. We focus on the UNIRS scheme, which is the most important 
scheme in the ARRCO group. It was created in 1957. At that time, people could only 
contribute to the system between 21 and 65, even if they had begun to work younger 
and stopped older
4. There was thus no incentive to delay retirement after 65.  For 
retirement below 65, the number of points was reduced by 5 percentage point per 
missing year.  
Rules change in 1965. New proportionality coefficients were settled. Since the 1982 
pension reform, this adjustment is not applied to people with more than 37.5 years of 
contribution. When people have more than 32.5 years of contribution but do not have 
37.5 years of the NT value of equation (3) for the post 1993 reform, their benefits is still 
reduced using proportionality coefficients depending either on their age or on the 
                                                       
4 The minimum age was suppressed in 1971, the maximum age in 1983.   11
number of quarters missing to reach Nmax. The different proportionally coefficients 
are given in table 1.  
Table 1: Value of the proportionality coefficient in the UNIRS scheme 
Between 1965 and 1982 
Age  60 61 62 63 64 
Proportionality coefficient 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.96 
After 1982 
Age  60 61 62 63 64 
Missing  quarters  20 16 12  8  4 
Proportionality coefficient 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.96 
 
Since 1999, pension benefits can be claimed at 55. At this age, the number of points 
used to calculate the pension benefit is equal to 0.43% of the total number earned. 
This proportionality coefficient is increased by 0.0175 percentage point per quarter 
until 60.  
The ARRCO complementary survivor benefit amounts to 60% of the deceased spouse 
complementary benefit. There is no mean-test condition to receive a complementary 
survivor pension. But an age condition remains: 55 for ARCCO.  
 
Evolution of the AGIRC pension scheme 
The AGIRC scheme was created in 1947 for executives. Until 1988, the contributions 
were collected by AGIRC for the segment of the wage which was between 1 and 3 
ceilings. The threshold was then increased to 8 ceilings. Normal retirement age is 65. 
Between 1947 and 1955, the number of points earned by individuals was decreased 
by 5 percentage point a year if they claimed their benefits between 60 and 64 and 
multiplied by 1.05 to 1.25 from 66 to 70 or more.  
The proportionality coefficients for retirement after 65 were suppressed in 1955 and 
the coefficients for early retirement changed in 1964. At 55, the number of points used 
to compute the pension benefit was equal to 0.43% of the total number earned. This 
proportionality coefficient increased by 0.0175 percentage point per quarter until 60, 
then by 0.0125 percentage point per quarter until 62 and by 0.01 percentage point per 
quarter until 65. Since the 1982 reform, the conditions to claim a pension are the same 




The State civil servant scheme offers contributory benefits corresponding to a share of 
the last gross wage. The principle is that the pension is proportional to the number of 
quarters of contribution to the system (truncated to Nmax quarters), and to the last 
gross wage, excluding bonuses.
6 The equation giving the initial pension level is 
therefore: 
                                                       
5 Most of the informations on the Civil servants pension schemes are issued from Blanchet and Mahieu 
(2004).  
6 Bonuses represent in average 18% of the net income and can reach 50% for some specific categories. 
These bonuses remain however insignificant for most civil servants working for the Education 
Department, which is the largest public employer.    12
( ) bonuses excluding wage gross last
N











× =     (5) 
As a general rule, pension claiming is feasible at age 60, if people have at least 15 
years of services. A rather large minority can however leave at age 55: primary school 
teachers, policemen, prison officers… For parents who have bred at least 3 children, 
the age condition is even completely relaxed if they fulfil a condition of interruption of 
career at the birth of the children.. 
The key variable is the number of years a civil servant has worked. Each year entitles 
her to a 2% of the last gross wage annuity, the sum being truncated to 75%. Once this 
basic annuity is computed, some other periods may be taken into account: the most 
important provision is an additional year given to women for each child they have 
bred. Some of these additional years yield an additional 2% annuity that may increase 
the basic annuity up to 80%.  
When the pension benefit falls below a floor, it is raised to the level of that floor, 
determined by the number of quarters of contribution to the system and the benefit is 
not restricted to full rate pensions unlike in the private sector.  
Until 2003, the pensions of the civil servants were indexed on the wages of the civil 
servants. 
The general formula of the basic pension and the computation of each of the 
components of the pension have remained unchanged between 1964 and 2003. The 
2003 reform introduced several incentives to postpone the retirement age (with an 
increase of the target number of contributed quarters) and to add more actuarial 
fairness in the rules. The 2003 reform also introduced indexation on prices, 
consistently with the private sector pension scheme. 
Survivor benefits are paid to surviving wife
7 of a deceased worker without any age or 
income conditions. The survivor benefits amounts to 50% of the deceased spouse 
complementary benefit. 
                                                       
7 The law has been changed in 2003. The gender condition has been suppressed.    13
II - Data description 
The objective of this article is to study the link between some observable indicators 
characterizing the elderly and the evolution in the generosity of the pension scheme. 
In France, we do not have any comprehensive survey that provides simultaneously 
information on labor income, consumption, subjective well-being or on the number of 
contribution quarters to the pension schemes. Failing this, we rely on several 
databases to compute either the well-being indicators or simulated pension benefits.  
 
II.1 Well-being indicators 
The data are issued from the "Budget des Familles" survey (Insee). The "Budget des 
Familles" survey is the best household survey that we have in France to answer the 
question of the well-being of the elderly. It has been conducted every five years since 
1979. We therefore use five waves: 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2001. Between 9,000 
and 15,000 households were interviewed at each wave
8. The survey is specifically 
dedicated to the study of consumption, which makes it extremely rich as far as 
consumption is concerned. It also gives a special attention to income. It provides 
precise information on wages and pensions. Eventually, the survey also includes a 
subjective measure of well-being.  
The fact that the “Budget des familles” survey is a household survey is an important 
but frequent drawback in a study of the well-being of the elderly. Indeed, persons 
living in specific institutions like nursing homes are not interviewed, which is the case 
of a large proportion of the eldest of elder persons in France. The basic unit is the 
group of persons living in the same household. However, the survey also provides 
some crucial information at the individual level. It is thus possible to compute the 
variables of interest at the family level, defined as the group composed by an 
individual, his spouse and the children living with them, but this step requires to make 
some strong assumptions on the repartition of some amounts (for instance taxes) 
within the household. It seems thus more reliable to work at the household level. 
However, this matter is not crucial at all as a large proportion of households (88% in 
1979) are made up of only one family. Moreover, elder people living with their children 
are quite few in France.  
To compare the well-being of the elderly with the well-being of younger individuals, we 
define ‘non-elderly’ households as households in which nobody is older than 64 and 
‘elderly’ households as households in which there is at least one member older than 
64. Income and consumption data are normalized by an equivalence scale to account 
for the size of the household. The scale is the OECD equivalence scale in which the 
first adult is counted as one, each subsequent adult as 0.7 and each child under 18 as 
0.5. To take into account that some households can be composed of more than one 
elderly, we weight the elderly households by the number of members older than 64. 
The analysis encompasses three aspects of elderly well-being: income, consumption 
and happiness. For a household, net income is defined as the sum of income from all 
sources (wages, pensions, real estate income, subsidies) minus all taxes (income tax, 
housing taxes). We use these data to make four income-based measures of well-
being for elderly households: Social Security income, total household income, 
absolute and relative poverty. Relative poverty is defined as follows. An elderly 
household is defined as poor, in a given year, if its income is below forty percent of the 
median non-elderly income in that year
9. For absolute poverty, we use the standard 
                                                       
8 14,250 households in 1979; 11,977 in 1984; 9,038 in 1989; 12,960 in 1994 and 10,305 in 2001. 
9 Two measure of poverty are used. The definition of the first one is not standard in France but comparable 
to international studies made on the same subject.    14
indicator with a threshold equal to one half of the median income of a base year 
(1979), adjusted for price inflation.  
Consumption is defined as total household consumption. We construct three 
consumption-based measures of well-being for elderly households: total household 
consumption and absolute and relative consumption poverty. The definitions for 
absolute and relative poverty in consumption are the same as the ones used for 
income.  
Finally, each ‘Budget des familles’ survey includes a question about how households 
assess their financial situation. The question is exactly the same for the last four 
surveys but is a little different in 1979, where the question was more on the budget 
than on the financial situation. We will make the assumption that this survey change 
affects all the age categories in the same way, which is a fairly weak assumption. We 
can thus group the answers into three groups: comfortable financial situation, 
acceptable financial situation, difficult financial situation. These last indicators will be 
used thereafter as subjective well-being measures. We have to keep in mind in the 
following that it is not a general measure of happiness or life satisfaction but a 
subjective indicator of the feeling of households concerning their financial means.  
Table 2 gives a summary of the availability of the well-being data.  
Table 2: Availability of Well-Being Data 
Measure  Source  Years available Ages availableNumber of obs.  Variable description 
Benefits  Family Budget Survey 




65 -> 100  14422  Household net benefits 
Income  Family Budget Survey 




65 -> 100  14422 
Household net income 
Relative and absolute 
income poverty rate 
Consumption  Family Budget Survey 




65 -> 100  14422 
Household consumption 
Relative and absolute 
consumption poverty rate 
Self-assessed 
life satisfaction 
Family Budget Survey 




65 -> 100  14422  Assessed financial 
situation 
 
II.2 Pension benefits 
There is no comprehensive survey providing simultaneous information on past labor 
income, number of contribution quarters and labor force participation since the 70’s in 
France. We thus rely on four databases to simulate the private sector pension 
benefits: the annual declarations of social data for wage history (DADS, INSEE); the 
wage files of state civil servants (INSEE), the échantillon interrégime de retraités 
(DREES) for the number of quarters by retirement age; the Labor Force Survey for the 
activity rate of the elderly (enquête Emploi, INSEE).  
The DADS is an administrative database collected by the French Statistical Institute 
(INSEE). The data are based upon mandatory employer reports of the gross earnings 
of each employee subject to the French payroll taxes. Each worker in the private 
sector is concerned. The French Statistic Institute prepares an extract of the data 
covering all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of 
even-numbered years. For each observation, we have information on gender, 
occupation and the annualized gross nominal earnings. A panel has been specially   15
made
10 to study earnings profiles between 1967 and 2000 for several cohorts born 
between 1908 and 1980.  
The échantillon interrégime de retraités (hereafter referred to as the EIR) matches 
administrative data collected from all pension schemes that exist in France. For the 
first run, in 1988, four cohorts of pensioners were selected (those born in 1906, 1912, 
1918 and 1922) and their national identification number were transmitted to all existing 
pension schemes (more than 120 basic schemes and about 180 complementary 
schemes). All these pension schemes then had to search for these individuals in their 
records and return the information to a central organization that carried out the 
matching if they were in. The operation was renewed in 1993 and 1997 for several 
news cohorts: cohort 1926 in 1993, cohorts 1930, 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940 and 
1942 in 1997. We have thus accurate information on the mean number of quarters for 
men and women for a large range of cohorts.  
The French Labor Force Survey has been conducted by the French National 
Statistical Institute (INSEE) since 1950. Households included in the Labor Force 
Survey sample are interviewed in March of three consecutive years with one-third of 
the households replaced each year. The survey samples are representative of the 
French population aged 15 and up. Education and labor market status are completed 
for each interview. We use the 1968-2001 waves of the French LFS to compute the 
probability to retire by age and cohort.  
                                                       
10 Cf. Koubi (2004).   16
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III - Empirical Strategy and simulated benefits 
III.1 Methodology 
A main point has to be considered when studying the causal effect of Social Security 
programs on the standard of living of the elderly. The pension benefits may indeed be 
endogenous. For example, if individuals become poorer and social security is 
redistributive, then observed social security benefits will decrease less or possibly 
increase to compensate individual’s poverty. Empirical regressions will make it appear 
as if Social Security programs were deteriorating living conditions even if there is no 
causal relationship. The relation between Social Security benefits and well-being 
indicators may also be due to spurious correlation if observed retirement incomes and 
the measures of well-being are codetermined by the same factors, for instance 
economic growth, without any causal effect.  
To circumvent this problem, we simulate Social Security benefits which are primarily 
functions of the pension schemes rules. We work at the birth cohort level. The idea is 
to abstract from differences in characteristics of recipients and focus solely on the 
variations in benefits that arise from pension schemes. Identification is provided by 
legislation variations. We can thus use instrumental variables methods and regress 
the outcome variables on Social Security income, instrumented by simulated benefits. 
At the individual level, pension benefits depend on three main components: the rule of 
the pension system, the wage profile and the length of the career. Retirement paths 
can be endogenous to Social Security rules, i.e. individuals can decide to claim their 
pension earlier, even with a reduction, if the system became more generous. In that 
case, the pension benefit level may be lower than with a less generous system and 
the conclusion of a standard regression model could be a negative effect of the 
generosity of the pension scheme on the financial well-being indicators of the elderly. 
The method allows us to disentangle the part of the variation deriving from the change 
in the Social Security rules from other changes.  
For comparison purpose we will bring both standard and instrumental variables 
regressions into play in the sequel. For a given cohort a in year y we define Bay as the 
actual benefits, SBay as the simulated benefits and WBay as the outcome or well-being 
indicators of interest. The empirical methodology will be the following. 
1)  The regression of simulated benefits on actual benefits in order to test the 
correlation between both. Year dummies, age dummies and individuals 
characteristics, denoted Xay hereafter, are included in the regression:  
2)  The estimation of a reduced form model, i.e. regression of well-being 
indicators on the observed benefits. We have thus:  
3) The estimation of the instrumental variables model, with simulated benefits. 
 
III.2 Simulation 
The benefits are simulated for workers of the private sector and civil servants. They 
are simulated by generation, gender, age, sector and, in the private sector, for 
executive and non-executive workers. To control for differences in characteristics of 
ε β α + + = ay ay ay X SB B
ε δ γ + + = ay ay ay X B WB
ε δ γ + + = ay ay ay X SB WB  18
recipients, we simulate pensions holding the earnings history and the number of 
contribution quarters constant. Simulations of benefits are based on a given earnings 
history for some fixed cohort of workers.  
For workers in the private sector, we use the DADS wage data for cohorts 1936 and 
1938
11. These birth cohorts fulfil one main condition which is that individuals have to 
be observed at least 25 years before retirement to simulate the basic scheme pension 
benefits. Under the assumption that the last earnings are the best ones, we need 
wages from 30 to 55 for early retirement and to 65 for normal retirement age. Our 
dataset provides this information by gender and by qualification. The main drawback is 
however that we don’t have any information on the wage history for this cohort before 
age 29 and this information is needed to simulate pension benefits for private sector 
complementary schemes. Wage histories are therefore completed using the wage 
growth rate of the 1948 generation between 18 and 29 years old
12. The graph of the 
wage curves between 18 and 35 by birth cohorts do indeed shows that the trends are 
quite similar, even if the levels are different. At last, few individuals are retiring after 
65. To simulate their pension, we complete career histories assuming that the wage 
curve, in real terms, is flat at the end of one’s career, i.e. after 55, and we index last 
wages on price inflation. We use the French consumption price index to adjust 
earnings profile for inflation for earlier and later cohorts. All birth cohorts have thus the 
same real earning career. We distinguish three groups of workers: low wage earners 
whose careers are always at the minimum wage; median earners; and high wage 
earners who earn the mean wage of executives. 
Things are easier for civil servants. Only the last wage is required to compute 
simulated benefits. To be consistent with the private sector, we build three career 
histories for the 1937 cohort corresponding to the same criteria: low wage earners 
whose careers are always at the minimum wage; median earners; and high wage 
earners who earn the mean wage of executives.  
The number of quarters, depending on the length of the career, is provided by the EIR 
data for cohort 1934
13. Knowing all these components, we can compute benefits for 
each year of birth at each possible retirement age, for each category of workers. To 
take into account the potential endogeneity of the retirement paths we carry two sets 
of estimation to test the robustness of the results. First, we use the observed 
retirement paths in the French Labor Force Survey to compute a weighted average. 
This set of simulations is referred hereafter as “partially simulated” or “mixed” 
simulation. Second, we carry out a set of simulation with the retirement path of the 
1935 generation applied to all the cohorts
14. It is hereafter referred “fully simulated” or 
“pure” simulation. In that case, the variation in the pension benefits is the variation 
deriving from the change in the Social Security rules. Pensions by age and year are 
thus obtained by weighting simulated pension obtained at the disaggregated level by 
the share of the different groups in the total population. The coefficients are provided 
by the Labor Force survey for each generation. Finally, survivor benefits are simulated 
equal to 50% of the mean pension. 
 
III.3 Observed and simulated benefits 
The increase in observed benefits has been really significant in France from the late 
70s to the late 90s both in level and relatively to the average worker income. This can 
                                                       
11 In the database, earnings profiles are always made for two cohorts, in order to increase the sample size.   
12 For executive workers, we complete the career only between 22 and 29 years old because they begin to 
work later.  
13 The last wave of the EIR being 2001, choosing cohorts 1936 or 1938, we wouldn’t have the number of 
contribution quarter for the eldest in the youngest cohorts (i.e. for individuals older than 64).  
14 The last wave of the Labor Force survey being 2002, choosing cohorts 1936 or 1938, we wouldn’t have 
the retirement path for the eldest in the youngest cohorts.   19
be explained by several factors. First, workers have better past labor incomes when 
they arrive at the retirement age and claim for their pension. Second, more women 
have personal pension benefits, possibly added to survival benefits. Third, the change 
in pension rules has tended towards an increase in the system’s generosity at the 
beginning of the period, among other with a high indexation coefficient for the basic 
pension. The 1993 reform has tended towards a diminution of the system’s generosity. 
We can see an inflexion in figure 1 with a decrease in the level of observed benefits 
and in their ratio to the average worker income which may be a first effect of this 
reform
15.  


















Average benefits Average benefits / average worker income
 
 
Average simulated benefits are given in figure 2. The shape of benefits in figure 2 
exhibits some differences with observed benefits in figure 1. The difference between 
the two figures is explained by the differences in definition of the benefit indicator. In 
figure 1, benefits are calculated at the individual level. In figure 2, mean pension 
benefits are calculated at the household level and normalized by an equivalence scale 
to account for the size of the households. The decrease of the mean pension benefit is 
lower in the second case. 
The main change between the pure and mixed simulation approaches is the difference 
in the retirement path of the individuals. Benefit levels predicted for the mixed 
simulation approach are higher than the ones predicted for the fully simulated 
approach. This means that, should people from other generations have had the 
retirement path of the 1935 generation, they would have had lower benefits levels. 
This suggests an optimal adjustment of the age of retirement of the worker to the 
pension benefits scheme rules. A comparison between the two specifications and 
observed benefits shows that simulated benefits are always a bit higher than observed 
benefits. This can be explained by an under-estimation of the income tax in the 
simulations.  
                                                       
15 The decrease of the mean pension benefit is lower when pensions are normalized by an equivalence 
scale to account for the size of the household, what is done thereafter.    20































The differences between observed and simulated benefits are higher at the end of the 
period. The change in pension rules combined with changes in the labor market can 
explain this. Benefits are simulated holding constant the earnings history and the 
number of contribution quarters. They correspond to a typical career of someone born 
in the mean 30s, with no unemployment or part-time spell during his/her working 
history. But, after the crisis at the beginning of the 70s, more and more people have 
suffered non-employment spells. The 1993 reform requiring an increase in the length 
of contribution to the pension scheme and a greater number of wages for the 
computation of the pension benefits, the impact of the assumptions made on the 
individuals working life is higher at the end than at the beginning of the period.  
For simulations, we have distinguished three groups of workers: low wage earners 
whose careers are always at the minimum wage; median earners; and high wage 
earners who earn the mean wage of executives. Low wages and incomplete careers 
being often correlated, we have simulated low wage earners benefits with the 10
th 
percentile of the number of contribution quarter per cohort. Mean numbers of 
contribution quarters have been used in other cases. Comparison between low-, 
mean- and high-earner simulated benefits and the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of 
Social Security Income are given in figures 3. Simulated and observed benefits 
exhibits a good match.    21






































Note: low, mean and high benefits correspond to the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of Social Security 
Income; low, mean and high earners to simulated benefits.    22
Figures 4 and 5 compare simulated benefits for birth cohorts affected differently by the 
1982 reform. The change in the normal retirement age from 65 to 60 was decided in 
1982. The pension rules were thus different for generations 1914 or 1919 and 
generations 1924 or 1929. These differences appear in the figures. We can indeed 
observe that benefits at 61 are much higher for generations 1924 or 1929 than for 
older cohorts. More attention will be devoted to these cohorts in section 5.  
Differences in pension benefit by age in figures 6 and 7 are more complex to interpret. 
They mix changes in pension rules and pension upgrade after retirement.  
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Figures 6: Simulated Benefits by Ages  
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IV - Results 
IV.1 Time Series Evidence 
Time series evidence for the measures of well-being data are given in figures 8 to 18. 
Figure 8 exhibits benefits calculated at the household level and normalized by an 
equivalence scale to account for the size of the households.  





















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
Index value 100 is equal to
€ 7,102 for elderly
(2001 constant €)
 
Each figure from 9 to 18 shows two lines representing respectively the elderly and non 
elderly well-being measures. The latter group is included to capture economic trend. 
Series are rescaled to fit on the same graph and well-being measures are in real 
terms, data representing for each wave the amount per person in 2001 euros.  
The means and the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of total household incomes, 
normalized by the OECD equivalence scale, have increased in France from the late 
70s to the late 90s. The increase in the mean has been higher for the elderly. 
Although the difference was of nearly 2500€ at the beginning of the period, the two 
means were equal in 2001. The decrease in the difference between elderly and 
working age households is mostly due to the increase in the benefits level underlined 
previously. The increase in the income level of the elderly has been higher at the 
bottom of the distribution, reducing inequalities.  
At the same time, the relative poverty has decreased in France from the late 70s to 
the mid 90s. Since that period, the relative poverty rate is more or less steady
16.  The 
trends have been very different for young and elder households. The poverty rate has 
been higher for the elderly at the beginning of the period. With increases in benefits 
until the mid 90s, the relative poverty rate of the elderly decreased below the poverty 
rate for younger households. For the working age households, the poverty rate has 
been more or less steady at the beginning of the period, even if the mean income has 
increased. With the higher rate of unemployment and part time work since the 
                                                       
16 Cf. Hourriez and al. 2001.   28
beginning of the 90s, their poverty rate has increased. We note a slight decline at the 
end in the late 90s with the improvement in the economic situation observed in France 
at that time. Trends are the same for absolute poverty.  
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.052 for young and
0.108 for elderly
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.084 for young and
0.194 for elderly
 
























1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly 10th percentile elderly 50th percentile
elderly 90th percentile young 50th percentile
Index value 100 is equal to
10,775 for 50th young,
4,245 for 10th elderly,
8,039 for 50th elderly and
18,088 for 90th elderly.
 
As for income, the means and the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of total household 
consumption, normalized by the OECD equivalence scale, have increased in France 
from the late 70s to the late 90s. The trends in the means are the same as the trends 
observed for mean total household income: the levels are lower for the elderly but the 
growth rates higher. The consumption poverty rate is always higher for the elderly (the 
trend was reversed during the period for the income poverty rate), even if it decreases 
at a higher rate than for the working age household.    30
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.059 for young and
0.196 for elderly
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
elderly 10th percentile elderly 50th percentile
elderly 90th percentile young 50th percentile
Index value 100 is equal to
13,390 for 50th young,
4,233 for 10th elderly,
9,095 for 50th elderly and
21,597 for 90th elderly.
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Concerning the measure of subjective well-being, life satisfaction increases and 
dissatisfaction decreases during the period. We can note on graphs 10 and 11 a peak 
in 1984, just after the change in the French government economic policy in 1983. After 
a period of expansion policy, the government moved to a politic of financial stringency.  
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elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.108 for young and
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year
elderly young
Index value 100 is equal to
0.107 for young and
0.101 for elderly
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IV.2 Regressions results 
Three sets of results are available in tables 3 and 4.  The first set of regressions 
corresponds to regressions of observed benefits on simulated pensions; the second is 
issued from reduced form regressions of well-being indicators on simulated pensions 
and the third is obtained performing instrumental variables regressions. In that case, 
indicators of well-being are regressed on observed benefits, using simulated pensions 
as instruments.  Regressions for means of income or consumption are made using 
either the mean observed benefits or the median earner simulations. For the poverty 
rates or percentiles regressions, we do not measure actual benefits on average for the 
full population but as averages for the relevant sub-population. For example, for 
poverty, the average social security benefits are computed among families living 
below the poverty line; for the 10
th percentile among families with family income 
between the 5
th and the 15
th percentiles and so on. Low wage earner simulated 
benefits are used for the poverty and the 10
th percentiles regressions, median earner 
simulated benefits for the mean and 50
th percentiles regressions and high earner 
simulated benefits for the 90
th percentiles regressions. For subjective well-being 
indicators, regressions are made using successively the three levels of simulated 
pension benefits for low, mean and high wage earners.  


































Mean Income 12586 14422
0,047   
(0,030)

































50th Pct Inc 11189 14422
-0,062   
(0,0958)
-0,013   
(0,111)
-0,182   
(0,313)
-0,034   
(0,285)









First Stage Reduced Form IV
 
 
Columns 4 and 5 in tables 3 and 4 correspond to the regressions of observed benefits 
on simulated pensions. Controls are gender, education and marital status. High wage 
earners being defined as individuals who earn the mean wage of executives, 
education has been dropped in the percentiles regressions. The regression 
coefficients of observed pension benefits on simulated benefits are highly significant 
and quite analogous between regressions on fully or partially simulated benefits.  An 
interesting thing to note is that the coefficients are the highest for the 10
th percentile of 
benefits and low wage earner simulations, being equal to 0.863 for the partially 
simulated benefits and to 0.884 for fully simulated benefits. Simulations fit better the 
data at this level because there is less heterogeneity in workers’ careers at the bottom 
of the distribution than at the mean or top level. The lowest coefficients are for the 
median level where the correlation between observed and simulated benefits is 
between 0.3 and 0.4. In that case, simulations are issued from observations on the 
mean income and the dependant variable is the median.    34









































10th Pct Cons 7040 14422
0,250*  
(0,139)






50th Pct Cons 11550 14422
-0,153   
(0,135)
-0,051   
(0,155)
-0,452   
(0,456)
-0,129   
(0,407)































































First Stage Reduced Form IV




90th Pct SS Inc
 
Note: Controls are gender, education and marital status. Education has been dropped in the percentiles regressions. 
 
The results of reduced form regressions of indicators of well-being on simulated 
pensions are given in columns 6 and 7 of tables 3 and 4.  The last set of results, 
columns 8 and 9, is obtained performing instrumental variables regressions.  Results 
are quite similar for fully and partially simulated benefits and are analogous for 
reduced form or instrumental variables regressions analysis. Coefficients are higher in 
the second case.  
The impact of an increase in the pension level on the mean income is only significant 
for fully simulated benefits. The difference between fully and partially simulated 
benefits is due to differences in the retirement path of the individuals. In the first case, 
we have used for each cohort the retirement paths observed in the French Labor 
Force Survey; in the second case we have carried out a set of simulations holding the 
retirement path constant and using the one’s of the 1935 generation. The effects of 
pension rules are significant only when holding the retirement path constant; i.e. when 
all else is equal except the pension rules. We have in that case an identification of the 
impact of changes in the rules of social security on the income level. This suggests an 
important crowding out effect; which means that individuals have adapted their 
behavior to changes of the pension system.  Indeed, the decrease in the mean 
retirement age was very important after the 1982 reform. As this reform is one of the 
main changes in social security pension rules during the period, most of the 
identification of the model relies on it.  At the mean level, when significant, estimated 
coefficients are very small. Results are more contrasted with the percentiles 
regressions.  
The coefficients are higher at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. Taken fully 
simulated benefits and reduced form regression, a one euro increase in simulated 
benefits leads to a 0.33 euro increase in after-tax income at the 10
th level of the 
distribution and to a 0.62 euro increase at the 90
th level. For instrumental variables 
regressions, a euro increase gives nearly a one to one match at the top of the   35
distribution. Regressions exhibit no crowding out effects at the top of the distribution 
and less at the bottom than at the mean level. For the richer, we can imagine less 
substitution with labor force participation but higher with saving than for the other 
groups. We are not able to check this in our data. Anyway, due to the extent of the 
pension scheme this phenomenon is probably less important in France than in other 
countries. For individuals at the bottom of the distribution, an increase in the 
generosity of social security rules induces an increase in income. Even if people 
adjust their behavior to changes in the social security rules, they seize the opportunity 
of an increase in the pension systems generosity to increase their income.  
As far as poverty is concerned, nearly all results are non significant. Regressions are 
made using low wage earners simulations which are probably not the best indicator to 
test poverty.  It is more likely that poor people would be those non-eligible for a 
pension but eligible for a minimum allocation, the AVTS, given in France to old age 
workers under income conditions. Previous studies have shown that the decrease in 
old age poverty in France has been due to the pension system but essentially via 
mechanisms such as the AVTS. Since we can not control for the specific 
characteristics of individuals eligible to the AVTS, it might be excluded variables that 
drives the results in the regression on income poverty.  
Results exhibit similarities in the patterns of consumption and income.  Consumption 
behavior follows the changes in earnings. We note, for consumption as for income, a 
high crowding out effect which is contrasted. Results are significant at the mean, 
bottom and top of the distribution but not at the median level. The coefficients are 
higher at the top of the distribution than at the bottom or at the mean. The main 
difference between the two sets of indicators is relative to poverty. The regression 
coefficients on absolute consumption poverty are small but positive and significant. 
However, the same remark holds as for income poverty regressions.  
The impact of an increase in benefits has a direct effect on life satisfaction, i.e. it 
increases the share of old age households who declare to be satisfied and decrease 
the share of old age households who declare to be unsatisfied. For these subjective 
well-being indicators, regressions are made using successively the three levels of 
simulated pension benefits for low, mean and high wage earners. The impact is higher 
at the bottom level but still persists at the top level, but naturally for the satisfaction 
indicator only.    36  37
V - Focus on the 1982 and 1993 reforms 
Figures 4 and 5 compared simulated benefits for birth cohorts affected differently by 
the pension schemes reforms. They showed that simulated benefit profiles are 
different for the different cohorts, depending on the fact that people were concerned or 
not by the 1982 or 1993 reforms. Moreover, estimation results exhibits some crowding 
out effects suggesting that individuals have adapted their behavior to changes in 
pension rules either by changing their labor supply, their savings or the level of 
transfers from other family members. It is difficult with our data to disentangle these 
three possibilities. However, the patterns of the 1982 and 1993 reforms are opposite. 
The first reform induces an increase in the generosity of the system, the second a 
decrease in generosity. We can thus test whether the individual adjustment depends 
on the pattern of the reform.  
To begin, we have performed tests of structural change in the mean income and 
consumption instrumental variables regressions to test if our assumption of some 
breaks in 1982 or 1993 is supported by the data. Results are given in table 5. Tests of 
structural changes have been performed for each reform on the whole sample and 
then on subsamples to separate the effect of the reforms. The critical value of the χ2 is 
equal to 3.84. The assumption of a break is rejected only once, for the 1982 reform 
when the estimations are performed on the subsample of years 1979-1989.  
























































































Wald statistic 8,3 8,41 3,49 3,57 16,05 15,02 8,84 8,16
Income
Consumption
Before/After 1982 Before/After 1993 Before/After 1993 Before/After 1982
Whole sample Years 1979 - 1989 Whole sample Years 1984 - 2001
 
Note: Controls are gender, education and marital status. 
 
To evaluate the effect of the two reforms, we have thus performed difference in 
difference estimations using the "Budget des Familles" survey. Both reforms being 
only for workers of the private sector, we use workers of the public sector as the 
reference group. To be more precise, the reference group is composed of individuals 
living in households in which nobody is a former worker of the private sector. Results 
are given in table 6.   38
Table 6: Difference in difference models 
Treatment : cohorts born after 1921
Treatment : cohorts born after 1917
Treatment : cohorts born after 1921, 
without cohorts 1918-1921
Treatment : cohorts born after 1921
Treatment : cohorts born after 1917
Treatment : cohorts born after 1921, 
without cohorts 1918-1921
Before/After 1982
Cohorts born before 1924 Cohorts 1914- 1924
1,211**  (0,576) 0,860  (0,686)
0,214  (0,886) -0,311  (0,957)
-0,007  (0,762)
0,289  (0,849) -0,226  (1,041)
1,163**  (0,568) 0,808  (0,608)





Treatment : cohorts born after 1933
Treatment : cohorts born after 1933
Before/After 1993
Cohorts 1922 - 1936 Cohorts 1929 - 1936
Income
Consumption
-2,157**  (0,949) -1,762*  (1,059)
-4,520**  (2,094) -3,889*  (2,238)
 
Note: Controls are gender, age, education and marital status.  
 
For the 1982 reform we have made three regressions, depending on the definition of 
the cohorts affected by the reform. The change in the normal retirement age has been 
decided in 1982. We can thus either consider that: 
  the first cohort fully affected by the reform is the cohort 1922; 
  the first cohort partially affected by the reform is the cohort 1918 as people 
born in 1918 were 64 in 1982 and could thus retire one year before people of 
the 1917 cohort.  
In the first case, our treatment group consists in cohorts of workers of the private 
sector born after 1921, in the second case the treatment group is made of cohorts of 
workers of the private sector born after 1917. We have also performed estimations 
excluding cohorts born between 1918 and 1921 to avoid the contamination problem 
between groups. Results for mean income and consumption are similar in the three 
cases, i.e. the impact of the 1982 reform on the mean income is positive and 
significant and it is non significant for consumption. The coefficients are higher when 
we consider that the first cohort affected by the reform is generation 1922. To test the 
robustness of our results, we have restricted the sample to the 1914-1924 cohorts. 
Coefficients on income are no longer significant. Differences are greater between the 
younger and the oldest generations. This is consistent with the knowledge that many 
people were already on early retirement between 60 and 65 in the late seventies. 
They only switched from early retirement to retirement, and this lessened the impact of 
the reform.    
For the 1993 reform, the treatment group is easier to define as the reform was 
implemented on a cohort criterion. Individuals concerned by the reform are those born 
after 1933. The 1993 reform tended towards a diminution of the system generosity   39
and its impact on income and consumption is indeed highly significantly negative. 
Results are robust to the sample choice.  
The difference in the magnitude of the coefficients estimated for the 1982 and 1993 
reforms underlines that there is an asymmetry in the substitution effects between the 
different sources of income of the elderly depending on the sign of the change in 
generosity of the pension reforms.    40
Conclusion 
Changes in the pension system in France since the 50's have induced many changes 
in the well-being and standard of living of the elderly. Our estimations conclude to a 
general increase in income, consumption and subjective well-being. For income, a one 
euro increase in simulated benefit doesn't induce a one euro increase in after tax 
income (except at the top of the distribution), which shows some substitution between 
the different sources of income available for the elderly households. However, the 
effect of a change in the pension benefits remains significant.  
Estimation of difference in difference models to evaluate the impact on income and 
consumption of the 1982 and 1993 reforms underlines that it may exist asymmetry in 
the magnitude of substitution effects between the different sources of income of the 
elderly depending on the sign of the change in generosity of the pension reforms.  The 
1982 reform increases the generosity of the system. Its impact on mean income is 
positive and significant but it is non significant for consumption. The 1993 reform 
tended towards a diminution of the system generosity and its impact on income and 
consumption is high and significantly negative. Further research on that point should 
be made.   41
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